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enhanced trading. Market reforms were favourable for the development of financial markets – 
but these effects were not long lasting. 
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1. Introduction 
As China was and to some extent still is a centrally planned economy, the excessive 
government control is the most conspicuous peculiarity. Yet, since 1990, many regulatory 
changes have occurred that improved the legal framework and reduced barriers to trade. For 
instance the stamp tax, which buyer and seller have to pay for every transaction, was reduced 
several times. Diminishing transaction costs should have stimulated trading. State 
interventions like the prohibition of `illegal’ futures trading, however, could have outweighed 
other improvements. The overall impact of these regulatory changes is unclear and requires 
clarification to stimulate further beneficial economic reforms. 
The purpose of our study is twofold: first, our paper tries to reveal the impact of policy 
changes on market liquidity on the Shanghai (SSE) and Shenzhen (SZSE) stock exchanges 
from December 1990 to December 2002; second, we develop an analytical framework for 
analyzing the influence of regulatory changes on market liquidity. Our model allows 
anticipation of events, controls for unexpected macroeconomic shocks, accounts for 
contemporaneous market conditions and models the dynamic response of liquidity. Based on 
our empirical findings, we formulate policy recommendations to enhance market development 
not only in China – but also in other emerging markets. 
 Former research on the interrelation between market reforms and the development of 
Chinese financial markets concentrated mainly on responses of stock returns triggered by 
political events. Jin and Tang (2001) claimed that policy factors are the primary reason for 
market movements in the period from 1992 to 2000 in which 16 huge market fluctuations, 
whose amplitudes exceeded 20%, occurred. They stressed that 46% of all market fluctuations 
were due to regulatory changes. Shi (2001) demonstrated that policy changes were 
responsible for 30 out of 52 abnormal fluctuations during the period from 1992 to 2000.  Kim 
and Singal (2000) showed for several emerging markets that abnormal returns on stock 
markets could be observed about eight months prior to market liberalizations. These studies 
  
3 
underlined the predominant role of policy changes for share price movements – but they have 
not discussed whether market reforms have long run effects on market development. An 
exception is Firth, Fung and Poon’s (1998) analysis of the suspension of the Chinese Treasury 
Bond futures market because they estimated the impact of this specific regulatory change on 
liquidity and not only on stock returns – but their study was focused on this single event. A 
central aspect of market development is reaching a high level of market liquidity, which is a 
prerequisite for efficient markets, as transactions convey private information and increase the 
information content of share prices.1 Several papers emphasized that well-operating financial 
markets are a catalyst for economic development (see Levine and Zervos, 1998). In particular, 
higher market liquidity is positively related to economic growth, progress in productivity, and 
expansion of capital accumulation. Hence, market reforms should enhance market liquidity to 
facilitate investment and guarantee long run economic growth.  
Our paper is organized as follows. The literature review highlights the role of the state 
in Chinese stock markets and theoretical considerations concerning the relation between 
returns and liquidity. Part three describes the dataset and discusses different measures of 
market liquidity. Section four derives the empirical model followed by our findings.  Finally, 
the conclusion tries to identify policy recommendations based on our empirical results and 
provides advice for practitioners, who could benefit from higher liquidity. 
 
2. Literature review 
2.1. The role of the state in Chinese stock markets   
When SSE and SZSE were launched in the early 1990s, the State Council of China invented 
three different share categories in order to prevent the mass privatization of state-owned 
enterprises (SOE). This market segmentation has considerable impact on market liquidity, as 
only a small fraction of all shares is tradable. In particular, a SOE had to issue three different 
                                                 
1 This argumentation follows the seminal papers of Kyle (1985) and O’Hara (2003).  
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types of shares, when it restructured into a publicly listed company. About a third of a 
company’s equity are state shares hold by the bureaus of the Ministry of Finance and 
ultimately owned by the State Council. State shares cannot be traded, and their transfer is 
subject to multiple administrative approvals (see Green, 2003). Another third of a company’s 
equity is made up of legal person shares. They are allocated to other SOEs that contribute 
capital to restructure companies. They cannot be traded on stock exchanges, although they can 
be exchanged (see Green, 2003). The final third of a company’s equity are individual person 
shares that can be traded by private investors and institutions. Consequently, the free float 
(tradable shares) accounts for less than 25% - but it increases steadily. Fig. 1 plots the free 
float relative to the total market capitalization.  
Due to the socialist ideological heritage, the financial system is regarded as a passive 
instrument to serve the national economy in China (see Heilmann 2002). Hence, Chinese 
authorities from the outset strictly regulate financial markets. There are many regulatory 
authorities, such as the Central Financial Work Committee that sets the principles and major 
objectives of stock market regulation. The China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) 
is responsible for the executive work under the political supervision of the Central Financial 
Work Committee, the Central Bank of China, the Communist Party’s Central Committee and 
the Central Government of China.  
 
2.2. Relation between returns and liquidity 
There is a broad literature on the interrelation between expected stock returns and liquidity of 
individual stocks (see Amihud and Mendelson, 1986, Jacoby, Fowler, and Gottesman, 2000, 
Brennan and Subrahmanyam, 1996). They argued that rational investors require a 
compensation for holding assets with low liquidity due to liquidity risk. This strand of the 
literature focuses on cross-sectional differences in liquidity and risk premiums. As our study 
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analyzes changes of market liquidity in one country over time, we cannot work with these 
theoretical considerations. 
 The time-series behavior of market liquidity has not been extensively studied. An 
exception is the seminal paper of Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2001) that focused on 
NYSE data from 1988 to 1998. They calculated on a daily basis several aggregated market 
liquidity measures and explored their time series characteristics. To identify explanatory 
variables for market liquidity, they followed the inventory (see Demsetz, 1968, Stoll, 1978, 
Ho and Stoll, 1981) and informed trading (see Kyle, 1985, Admati and Pfeiderer, 1988) 
paradigms. The inventory paradigm stresses that liquidity depends on factors that affect the 
risk of holding inventory; thus, extreme events that provoke order imbalances and market 
conditions, namely market returns and volatility, are relevant factors.  
Informationally motivated trading affects liquidity; hence, the release of news 
concerning macroeconomic conditions should be relevant for liquidity. Jun, Marathe, and 
Shawky (2003) emphasized that macroeconomic variables, political conditions, and the legal 
framework determine market liquidity. Consequently, we control for unexpected 
macroeconomic shocks.  
Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2001) found seasonal patterns in market liquidity 
using daily data, and Draper and Paudyal (1997) detected seasonality in monthly market 
liquidity. As we work with monthly data, seasonal patterns like the January effect (see 
Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993) might play a role. The January effect refers to tax-motivated 
trading, namely selling stocks in December in order to reduce taxable income by realizing 
losses and buying stocks back in January. Due to the fact that capital gains are free of any 
taxes in China, the January effect is not observable (see Gao and Kling, 2005).  
In the time dimension, Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2001) showed that market 
returns positively affect market liquidity, which differs from cross-sectional studies. Hence, 
based on the inventory paradigm, we should expect a positive correlation between market 
  
6 
returns and liquidity, as positive returns reduce inventory risk. However, behavioral finance 
offers an additional explanation for a positive effect of market returns on liquidity, namely the 
disposition effect. Shefrin and Statman (1985) coined the term disposition effect that 
describes market agents’ inclination to sell winners too early and ride losers too long. 
Lakonishok and Smidt (1986) reported that abnormal trading volume is higher for winners; 
thus, their finding suggests that investors prefer selling winners. When market returns are 
positive, more stocks belong to the winner category. On an individual basis, investors are 
more willing to sell winners than losers; hence, when the market goes up, more transactions 
occur. 
 
3. The data 
Datastream comprises monthly stock prices of all `A shares´ listed on the SSE and SZSE from 
December 1990 to December 2002. Turnover ratios are calculated based on the data provided 
by the China Securities regulatory Commission (CSRC), namely monthly trading volume and 
monthly market capitalization (free float).2 Daily newspapers and other publicly accessible 
sources (like www.csrc.gov.cn) broadcast regulatory changes. Based on newspaper archives, 
we compiled the chronology of regulatory changes summarized in Table 1. 
Besides turnover ratios as measure of liquidity, Jun, Marathe, and Shawky (2003) 
recommend to calculate turnover-volatility ratios. Chinese stock markets are characterized by 
high volatility due to speculation; hence, using turnover-volatility ratios can control for these 
peaks in market fluctuations that do not contribute to long-term financial development.3 
Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2005) used the proportion of zero daily firm returns as 
indicator of liquidity. The advantage of this measure is that information on firm specific 
                                                 
2 Data are available online www.csrc.gov.cn. 
3 To calculate turnover-volatility ratios, we predict conditional volatilities applying GARCH(1,1) models to 
monthly stock returns (see Bollerslev, 1986). Then, turnover ratios are divided by conditional volatilities. 
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trading volume is not required. A practical problem of this measure is that daily stock returns 
for every listed firm are not available for the whole period from 1990 to 2002. Besides macro 
measures of liquidity, there exist several possibilities to observe liquidity on the micro level 
using stock specific data like bid-ask spreads (see Brockman and Chung, 2003). 
Unfortunately, micro level information is not available for the whole period under 
investigation. Moreover, data on firm specific trading volume provided by Datastream are not 
reliable for China; hence, indirect measures of liquidity that are based on regressing returns on 
volume are not feasible for our analysis. To illustrate the development of liquidity on both 
exchanges, Fig. 2 plots turnover ratios and turnover-volatility ratios. As trading mechanisms 
are almost identical and both exchanges are exposed to the same set of political and 
macroeconomic factors, one can observe a very similar pattern of market liquidity.   
As market liquidity could be affected by political as well as macroeconomic 
circumstances, we have to control for macroeconomic shocks. The IMF provides 
macroeconomic data for China; however, some series are not available for the whole 
investigation period. Expected macroeconomic changes should be reflected by stock market 
returns – but sudden unexpected shocks might have an impact. In line with multi-factor 
models and more precisely Chen, Roll, and Ross (1986), who favored predefining a set of 
macroeconomic variables compared to factor analysis (Gehr, 1978, Roll and Ross, 1980), we 
use four relevant macroeconomic variables: manufacturing production, lending rates as a 
proxy for short run interest rates, exchange rates, and consumer prices.4 All variables are 
available on a monthly basis since December 1990 – except manufacturing production, which 
consists of quarterly information. To determine unexpected components of these 
macroeconomic variables, we follow Chen and Jordan (1993). Consequently, exploiting serial 
dependencies by autoregressive processes, macroeconomic shocks can be derived.  
                                                 
4 Exchange rates are more or less stable from 1990 to 2002, albeit a pronounced depreciation occurred in April 
1994 accompanied by the introduction of the Forex trading system. 
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4. The empirical model 
4.1. Descriptive statistics and unit-root tests  
Table 2 summarizes descriptive statistics of market returns, turnover ratios, turnover-volatility 
ratios, and unexpected macroeconomic shocks. In addition, column six shows test statistic of 
unit root tests to reveal whether the respective time series is stationary. All variables are 
stationary, as modified Dickey-Fuller tests reject their null hypotheses.5 Consequently, we can 
include market returns and our proxies for market liquidity as endogenous time series into a 
VAR framework to test for causalities in both directions. Average market returns are higher 
on the SSE compared to the SZSE, but volatility of market returns is higher on the SSE. On 
average, the SEE exhibits higher turnover ratios and turnover-volatility ratios; however, 
market liquidity fluctuates more on the SEE than on the SZSE.  
 
4.2. VAR approach and Granger causality tests 
To analyze the direction of causality between market returns and liquidity, we build up a 
simple VAR model and test for Granger causality. Market returns rt and market liquidity τt are 
both endogenous time series, which depend on their former values expressed by the sum of 
lagged returns rt-j and market liquidity τt-j. The vector c consists of constant terms for both 
equations, and the vector et contains error terms for both equations at time t.  
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To determine the optimal lag length p of the VAR model, the Akaike (AIC), Hannan-Quinn 
(HQIC), and the Bayesian information (BIC) criteria are calculated. For both exchanges and 
                                                 
5 Elliot, Rothenberg, and Stock (1996) modified the standard ADF procedure by applying a GLS approach to 
control for serial correlation and heteroscedasticity in the data. Yet standard ADF tests point in the same 
direction. Nevertheless, the GLS procedure increases the power of the ADF tests especially for smaller samples. 
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both measures of liquidity, all criteria favor one lag. Table 3 contains the outcomes of 
Granger causality tests, which are based on the basic VAR model (1) and two extended 
versions. Based on Table 1, we insert dummy variables for exogenous regulatory changes to 
account for structural shifts in constant terms. This enables to control for political events. 
Furthermore, the third specification of VAR models accounts for unexpected macroeconomic 
shocks. Based on causality tests, one can conclude that returns Granger cause turnover ratios 
– but not vice versa. Consequently, we confirm the findings of Jun, Marathe, and Shawky 
(2003).6 Motivated by Jun, Marathe, and Shawky’s (2003) and our finding that returns 
Granger cause liquidity, we can apply a transfer function approach to model turnover ratios, 
as returns can be regarded as exogenous.  
Granger causality tests for VAR model with turnover-volatility ratios underline that 
market returns do not influence turnover-volatility ratios significantly. This finding is due to 
the fact that by calculating turnover-volatility ratios the market condition, namely market 
volatility, is already included in this proxy of market liquidity.  
 
4.3. ARIMA specification of turnover ratios 
As returns Granger cause turnover ratios and not vice versa, we simplify our VAR approach 
in the sense that we impose restrictions on the coefficient matrix Φ; thus, we end up with a 
simple AR(p) specification and add potential moving average components. In line with Jun, 
Marathe, and Shawky (2003), we account for a linear time trend t in market liquidity. The 
series of market returns rt can be regarded as exogenous and might influence market liquidity 
τt. Consequently, one can call this model a transfer function approach in which the relation 
                                                 
6 They start with an extended CAPM that accounts for aggregated liquidity; hence, market returns are their 
dependent variable. They conduct Granger causality tests and underline that returns influence liquidity and not 
vice versa. We confirm this finding – but we start with a VAR approach; thus, we do not predefine that returns or 
liquidity are exogenous. Consequently, our approach differs – but the conclusion is exactly the same. 
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between market liquidity and returns is transferred by the arbitrary polynomial in the lag 
operator L denoted γ(L).7 Previous market liquidity τt-j accounts for the autoregressive AR(p) 
nature of liquidity, and former values of the error term ut-j represent the moving average 
component MA(q). 
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To determine the lag structure of the lag operator γ(L), cross-correlograms between market 
returns and liquidity are considered. For both exchanges, current market returns and the first 
lag affect current turnover ratios. This specification is in line with Chordia, Roll and 
Subrahmanyam (2001), who control for current market conditions by inserting volatility and 
returns. As we use turnover-volatility ratios, volatility is already reflected in our measurement 
of market liquidity; hence, we do not have to add volatility as explanatory variable.8 
 Besides finding an optimal transfer function, the ARMA specification of our model 
should be considered by applying standard Box-Jenkings procedures and comparing 
information criteria for different specifications. Based on the respective autocorrelation and 
partial autocorrelation functions, turnover ratios of the SSE and SZSE can be modeled as 
ARMA (1, 2) processes, whereas ARMA(1, 1) processes yield the best model fit for turnover-
volatility ratios for both stock markets.  
  
4.4. Intervention model 
                                                 
7 Enders (2004) discusses simpler transfer function models and is a useful source for understanding this 
approach. 
8 Compared to Bekaert, Harvey and Lumsdaine’s (2002) endogenous break model, our model also allows 
endogenous breaks in that an arbitrary lead/lag operator is inserted for every policy change. Based on cross-
correlations, we determine endogenously whether policy changes are anticipated. In contrast to Bekaert, Harvey 
and Lumsdaine (2002), our model allows long-lasting effects, and we model the dynamic response of liquidity 
triggered by policy changes. 
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We extend our transfer function approach by inserting the influence of regulatory changes; 
consequently, the model has now the following shape. 
t
K
k
kkt
q
j
jtj
p
j
jtjt udLrLumatbc +++++⋅+= ∑∑∑
==
−
=
−
111
)()( δγττ  
 (3)  
The K regulatory changes are modeled by dummy variables dk (k=1,…,K) that take the value 
one when the respective policy change occurred as listed in Table 1. The lag operator δk(L) 
allows an arbitrary lag or lead structure for every policy change. To determine the lag or lead 
structure of the market reaction triggered by regulatory changes, we derive cross-
correlograms for market liquidity and the respective regulatory change. Hence, the model 
allows that market liquidity increase in anticipation of liberalizations. Yet we cannot find 
evidence concerning anticipation, as only the cross-correlation coefficient at lag zero 
(immediate reaction) is significantly different from zero and reaches on average 0.174 for the 
SSE and 0.213 for the SZSE. 
 To account for unexpected macroeconomic shocks, which can be regarded as 
exogenous,9 we extent our intervention model (3) by inserting unexpected changes in 
manufacturing production (MPt), lending rates (LRt), consumer price changes (CPt), and 
exchange rate changes (ERt).10  
ttttt
K
k
kkt
q
j
jtj
p
j
jtjt
uERCPLRMP
dLrLumatbc
++++
+++++⋅+= ∑∑∑
==
−
=
−
4321
111
)()(
λλλλ
δγττ
 
 (4)  
Table 4 reports the outcomes of model (3) and model (4) for turnover ratios and turnover-
volatility ratios. Current and previous market returns have a positive influence on turnover 
ratios; this is in line with former findings of Jun, Marathe, and Shawky’s (2003) for several 
                                                 
9 Granger causality tests show that unexpected macroeconomic shocks are not Granger caused by market returns 
or market liquidity. 
10 The highest correlation coefficient among macroeconomic shocks is 0.2487 (between exchange rate and 
production shocks); therefore, multicollinearity is not a problem for our model (4). 
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emerging markets and of Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2001) for the NYSE. Whether 
the positive impact of market returns on liquidity is due to the inventory paradigm or the 
disposition effect is difficult to determine. Nevertheless, controlling for market returns seems 
to be warranted. When using turnover-volatility ratios as dependent variable, market returns 
have still a positive influence on liquidity, but coefficients are not significant for the SSE (p-
value is equal to 0.11). As sudden increases in share prices like on 21st March 1992 (see t=18 
in Table 1 and 4) are accompanied by a peak in conditional volatility, turnover-volatility 
ratios fall after the announcement of the “free stock price through free trading” rule. This 
explains why coefficients for the regulatory change in t=18 are negative and significant for 
the SZSE. Besides this deviation, results for turnover ratios and turnover-volatility ratios are 
rather similar. In all cases, linear time trends t are not relevant; hence, liquidity does not 
steadily improve over time, which is an important finding. Macroeconomic factors are not 
essential for explaining market liquidity in China; only an unexpected increase in inflation 
rates triggers lower turnover-volatility ratios on the SZSE. When we focus on economically 
and statistically important regulatory changes that are confirmed by all models, two negative 
events (t=43, 55) and eight positive reactions (t=33, 40, 54, 71, 72, 73, 78, 111) can be 
revealed. The prohibition of illegal futures trading (t=43) was counterproductive for market 
development and is one reason why derivative markets are still underdeveloped in China. Yet 
the second restriction concerning futures trading, namely with Treasury bonds as underlying, 
on 17th May 1995 (t=54) had a positive influence on market liquidity. This second policy 
change tried to restrict excessive speculation in the Chinese Treasury Bond market, which 
attracted a huge amount of hot money. Accordingly, we confirm the findings of Fung, Firth, 
and Poon (1998), who analyzed the impact of the suspension of the Chinese Treasury Bond 
futures market on market returns and liquidity. They showed that liquidity increases on both 
Chinese exchanges and explained this finding by spillover effects between the Treasury bond 
futures market and Chinese stock exchanges. The ban for commercial banks to enter stock and 
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trust businesses on 20th June 1995 (t=55) reduced the chance regarding the development of 
more mature institutional investors and led to a reduction in liquidity. The introduction of a 
common order-driven market (t=33) on the SEE caused higher liquidity on both exchanges, as 
this announcement was seen as a commitment for introducing more professional trading 
mechanisms. From 3rd October 1996 to 21st May 1997 (t=71, 72, 73, 78), a series of four 
regulatory changes occurred, which increased market liquidity. As these regulatory changes 
are timely very close, our intervention model cannot precisely distinguish among these policy 
changes because impacts overlap. Due to the autoregressive nature of turnover and turnover-
volatility ratios, about 70% of the impact of a policy change is still observable in the 
following months. Hence, the pronounced increase caused by the reduction of commissions 
for stock and fund transactions outweighed the negative impact of the prohibition of using 
bank loans for purchasing stocks. The larger range of price fluctuations announced on 16th 
December 1996 had a considerable positive impact on liquidity. Yet, the positive reaction 
caused by the ban of SOE and listed companies to conduct stock trading requires 
explanations. SOEs purchase usually shares of other SOEs for the sake of deterring takeovers. 
Shares hold by SOEs cannot be regarded as free-float (see Fig.1) and hence banning trades of 
SOEs should enhance market liquidity. Since 14th February 2002 (t=111), stock mortgage 
could be accepted by security companies, which stimulated trading. 
Based on the results summarized in Table 4 and the autoregressive nature of turnover 
ratios, Fig. 3 depicts the dynamic response in turnover ratios due to institutional reforms for 
both markets over the whole investigation period. Generally, both stock exchanges exhibit 
similar dynamic responses, and the regulatory impact lasts for several months. 
  
5. Conclusion 
Bekaert, Harvey and Lumsdaine (2002) found that financial markets tend to be more liquid 
after regulatory changes that enhance market integration. Our results suggest that reforms can 
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increase liquidity – but we cannot find a steady improvement of market liquidity over time. 
Policy changes announced in the daily newspaper trigger pronounced reactions in market 
liquidity regardless whether turnover or turnover-volatility ratios measure liquidity. 
Macroeconomic shocks hardly affect market liquidity.  
Applying our model to the SEE and SZSE allows detecting differences regarding their 
ability to tend back to equilibrium after an exogenous regulatory change.11 Accordingly, we 
can state that turnover ratios of the SSE reach their former values with higher velocity than 
turnover ratios of the SZSE. Yet when using turnover-volatility ratios this alleged advantage 
of the SSE vanishes, as the autoregressive nature is similar on both exchanges. Based on these 
findings, we can state that the SSE cannot cope better with political events than the SZSE. 
 Which policy recommendations should be drawn based on our empirical findings? The 
public release of information regarding an imminent regime shift possesses a strong influence 
on market liquidity. We can state that regulatory changes do not influence market liquidity in 
the long run. Regulatory changes alone are not a guarantee for higher market liquidity in the 
long run and hence have to be associated with advanced market integration (see Bekaert, 
Harvey and Lumsdaine (2002).  
 Practitioners should be aware of the fact that regulatory changes cause a pronounced 
increase in liquidity without increasing volatility; hence, trading large quantities becomes 
easier on the notoriously thin Chinese stock market after announced policy changes. 
  It is noteworthy that we achieved these results after controlling for stock returns, 
anticipation of regulatory changes, macroeconomic shocks, and the autoregressive nature of 
turnover and turnover-volatility ratios. Our methodology could be also applied to other 
financial markets and might stimulate additional research on the interrelation between legal 
frameworks and financial markets. 
 
                                                 
11 Note that we use the term `equilibrium’ in an econometric sense. 
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Table 1: Important regulatory changes from December 1990 to December 2002 
t Date Regulatory changes 
5 26.04.1991 The limit of daily price fluctuations increased from 0.5% to 1% 
7 03.06.1991 The stamp tax decreased from 0.6% to 0.3% 
18 
 
21.05.1992 
 
Free stock price through free trading – less control of price formation 
(The Shanghai Index increased from 617 point to 1266 point at that day) 
23 26.10.1992 China Securities Regulatory Commission opened on 25.10.1992 
33 
 
 
 
 
06.08.1993 
 
 
 
 
A common order-driven market for `A shares´ on Shanghai Stock Exchange 
was introduced 
(Buy and sell orders compete for the best price. Throughout the trading 
session, customer orders are continuously matched at a price satisfying both 
parties, according to price and time priorities.) 
40 
 
 
 
 
 
 
14.03.1994 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Announcement of `Four No´ rule on 12.03.1994 
(On 12.03.1994, the Chairman of China Securities Regulatory Commission 
(CSRC) announced that RMB 5.5 billion new shares are not allowed to be 
traded on stock exchanges within half a year; the transaction tax for stocks 
would not be levied in 1994; the state share and corporate share would not 
be listed in 1994; the control on listed company’s stock allotment right 
would not be relaxed.) 
43 15.06.1994 Prohibition of illegal futures trading 
45 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
01.08.1994 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Three bail-out measures were announced by the China Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC) on 30.07.1994 
(From 1993 to 1994 the Shanghai Stock Market Index decreased from 1500 
point to 325 point and the trading volume was extremely small. On 
30.07.1994, the CSRC announced three bail-out measures: stopping issuing 
new stocks, allowing security companies to finance and establishing joint-
funds with foreign financial institutions. On 01.08.1994, the Shanghai Stock 
Market Index increased by 33.2%, and some stocks appreciated nearly 
100%. In the next month, the index increased from above 300 points to 
above 1000 points.) 
50 
 
03.01.1995 
 
Initiate T+1 trading procedure 
(Stocks bought today cannot be sold until tomorrow. This reduces intra-day 
trading.) 
54 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
17.05.1995 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Stop of futures trading on Treasury Bonds  
(In early 1995, the overdue speculation in the Chinese Treasury Bonds 
Futures market attracted too much hot money from the Chinese stock 
market that exhibited a decline in daily trading volume to 20 million shares. 
On 17.05.1995, the CSRC banned the trading of futures on Treasury Bonds. 
On that day, the Chinese stock market index increased by 30.99% and the 
trading volume increased to RMB 8.493 billion. Within three days, the 
index increased 60 %.) 
55 20.06.1995 Ban for commercial banks to enter stock and trust businesses 
56 03.07.1995 Increase of the lending interest rate 
71 03.10.1996 Decrease in commissions for stock and fund transactions 
72 14.11.1996 
The Central Bank of China prohibits that bank loans can be used to invest in 
stocks 
73 16.12.1996 The limit of daily price fluctuation increased to 10% 
78 
 
21.05.1997 
 
Ban for SOE and listed companies to conduct stock trading. 
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79 
 
06.06.1997 
 
The Central Bank of China prohibits that assets owned or controlled by 
banks can be used to purchase stocks. 
91 12.06.1998 The stamp tax decreases from 0.5% to 0.4% 
102 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
19.05.1999 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) announced several 
regulatory changes 
(From May 1997 to May 1999, the Chinese stock market was a bear market; 
hence, trading volume was very small. On 19.05.1999, after a talk with the 
heads of security companies and the government, the China Securities 
Regulatory Commission announced several regulatory changes: 
reconstructing the stock issue mechanism, allowing assets of insurance 
companies to enter the stock market, improving the way of financing 
security companies (investment banks), allowing some security companies 
to issue bonds, enlarging the market size of investment funds, strengthening 
`B share´ market and allowing some `B share´ or `H share´ companies to re-
purchase their stocks. The market rose immediately.) 
106 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
08.09.1999 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
China Securities Regulatory Commission allowed SOEs, the state-
controlled enterprises and the listed companies to issue shares and trade 
stocks. 
(On 08.09.1999, China Securities Regulatory Commission allowed the 
SOEs, the state-controlled enterprises and the listed companies to issue 
shares and trade stocks at the first and second market. Yet the time span of 
round trips of the same stock must be longer than six months. On the 
ensuing day 09.09.1999, the Shanghai Exchange Index increased by 6.59%; 
however, this impact was not long lasting.) 
111 14.02.2000 Initiation of the rule regarding stock mortgage of security companies 
122 15.01.2001 
Stipulation concerning security companies’ senior mangers’ interview 
responsibilities 
131 
 
 
 
 
 
23.10.2000 
 
 
 
 
 
China Securities Regulatory Commission announced to provisionally stop 
selling state owned shares 
(On 23.10.2000, China Securities Regulatory Commission announced to 
provisionally stop selling state owned shared as IPO or APO. When the 
news arrived at the Chinese stock market, it increased nearly 10% 
immediately.) 
132 16.11.2001 The stamp tax decreased to 0.2%. 
139 
 
 
 
 
24.06.2002 
 
 
 
 
China Central Government announced to stop selling state owned shares 
(At 19 o’clock on 24.06.2002, China Central Television broadcasted the 
announcement that the China Central Government abolished to sell state 
owned shares.  On the following day, the market index increased nearly by 
10% and the trading volume of RMB 89.8 billion reached an all time high.) 
Note: The column `t´ indicates the respective month of the regulatory change during the 133 
months from December 1990 to December 2002. We provide additional explanations in 
parentheses.  
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics and unit root tests  
This table summarizes descriptive statistics of market returns, measures of market liquidity, 
and unexpected macroeconomic shocks. To test for stationarity, we apply a modified Dickey-
Fuller test and select the optimal lag by the Schwarz (SIC) criterion. *, **, and *** indicate 
significance on the 10, 5, and 1% level of significance.  
 Mean Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum ADF test 
statistic 
Market return rt 
(SSE) in % 
1.9372 17.1271 -37.3283 101.9663 -7.983*** 
Market return rt 
(SZSE) in % 
1.0378 13.8708 -28.9747 62.5077 -7.378*** 
Turnover ratio τt 
(SSE) in % 
2.5693 2.1481 0.0337 12.1507 -3.805*** 
Turnover ratio τt 
(SZSE) in % 
2.1194 1.8831 0.1871 9.3715 -3.852*** 
Turnover-volatility 
ratio τt (SSE) 
0.1874 0.1343 0.0018 0.7497 -3.706*** 
Turnover-volatility 
ratio τt (SZSE) 
0.1492 0.1066 0.0124 0.6688 -3.782*** 
Unexpected change 
in production MPt 
0.0284 2.5773 -9.5397 16.3383 -4.117*** 
Unexpected lending 
rate LRt 
-0.0036 0.2738 -0.7724 1.3320 -4.922*** 
Unexpected inflation 
CPt 
-0.0182 0.6735 -2.2682 3.5665 -6.633*** 
Unexpected changes 
in exchange rate ERt 
0.000 0.0091 -0.0591 0.0277 -10.560*** 
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Table 3: Granger causality tests for returns and liquidity measures 
We run VAR model with one lag and test for Granger causality between returns and market 
liquidity. The first three models use turnover ratios as measure of liquidity, while model (4), 
(5), and (6) use turnover-volatility ratios. Model (1) and (4) are VAR models with returns and 
liquidity as endogenous variables. Model (2) and (5) account for exogenous regulatory 
changes. Model (3) and (6) include policy changes and unexpected macroeconomic shocks.  
P-values are set in parentheses.  
Null hypotheses Granger causality tests – Wald test statistics 
 Shanghai Stock Exchange 
(SSE) 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
(SZSE) 
 Turnover ratios (1) 
Lagged returns Granger cause 
turnover ratios 
0.5937 (0.441) 6.7879 (0.009) 
Lagged turnover ratios Granger 
cause returns 
2.4817 (0.115) 0.9381 (0.333) 
 Turnover ratios with political events (2) 
Lagged returns Granger cause 
turnover ratios 
9.1273 (0.003) 15.8340 (0.000) 
Lagged turnover ratios Granger 
cause returns 
2.6420 (0.104) 0.2735 (0.601) 
 Turnover ratios with macro shocks (3) 
Lagged returns Granger cause 
turnover ratios 
10.388 (0.001) 16.8300 (0.000) 
Lagged turnover ratios Granger 
cause returns 
0.3358 (0.562) 0.0068 (0.934) 
 Turnover-volatility ratios (4) 
Lagged returns Granger cause 
turnover-volatility ratios 
1.3471 (0.246) 0.207 (0.649) 
Lagged turnover ratios Granger 
cause returns 
0.1595 (0.690) 0.9264 (0.336) 
 Turnover-volatility ratios with political events (5) 
Lagged returns Granger cause 
turnover-volatility ratios 
0.8498 (0.357) 0.1101 (0.740) 
Lagged turnover ratios Granger 
cause returns 
0.0513 (0.821) 0.6195 (0.431) 
 Turnover ratios-volatility with macro shocks (6) 
Lagged returns Granger cause 
turnover-volatility ratios 
0.2091 (0.647) 0.5105 (0.475) 
Lagged turnover ratios Granger 
cause returns 
0.2528 (0.615) 0.0148 (0.903) 
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Table 4: Intervention based model with regulatory changes 
*, **, and *** indicate significance on the 10, 5, and 1% level of significance. 
Model type Turnover ratios Turnover-volatility ratios Turnover-volatility ratios 
macroeconomic shocks 
 Shanghai Shenzhen Shanghai Shenzhen Shanghai Shenzhen 
rt 0.0363** 0.0437*** 0.0016 0.0027** 0.0016 0.0040 
rt-1 0.0262* 0.0374*** 0.0000 0.0010* 0.0002 0.0014 
T -0.0083 -0.0006 0.0003 0.0005 0.0000 0.0006 
t5 0.4352 - -0.0101 -  - - 
t7 -0.4815 - -0.0112 -   - - 
t18 -1.6735 0.2557 -0.107 -0.0749** -0.1113 -0.1376*** 
t23 1.9635* 0.1826 0.1335* 0.0102 0.1638* 0.0041 
t33 2.9763 1.2314*** 0.0721 0.1048*** 0.0686 0.0809** 
t40 3.0743** -0.3079 0.4913*** -0.0229 0.5070*** -0.0170 
t43 0.0661 -1.3877*** -0.0291 -0.0606* -0.0363 -0.0637*** 
t45 2.0888 -0.3623 0.0644 0.0870 0.0866 0.0310 
t50 -0.3394 -0.131 -0.0469 -0.0105 -0.0532 -0.0113 
t54 1.0939** 1.1221** 0.0990* 0.0865* 0.1321** 0.0754 
t55 -2.1027** -0.8064 -0.1239* -0.0676 -0.1046* -0.0582 
t56 -0.5794 -1.4421** -0.0630 -0.0703 -0.0565 -0.0541 
t71 2.0106* 1.6753*** 0.2008*** 0.3535*** 0.1863*** 0.3319*** 
t72 0.9372 2.5135*** 0.0152 0.1158*** 0.0081 0.0968** 
t73 5.9911*** 3.8839*** 0.4967*** 0.2548*** 0.4782*** 0.2868*** 
t78 1.3907*** 2.2176*** 0.0826** 0.1097*** 0.0820* 0.1206*** 
t79 0.2947 0.6775** 0.0165 0.0342 0.0235 0.0352 
t91 0.3037 0.1138 0.0309 0.0494 0.0333 0.0622 
t102 -0.9463 -0.3491 0.0224 0.0066 0.0264 0.0210 
t106 0.0738 -0.3313 0.0348 -0.0065 0.0289 -0.0050 
t111 1.7682*** 1.5185*** 0.1437*** 0.0948*** 0.1412*** 0.0881*** 
t122 0.4557** 0.1606 0.0526 0.0345 0.0522 0.0367 
t131 0.3798 -0.1640 0.0048 -0.0184 0.0020 -0.0191 
t132 -0.0494 -0.4480 -0.0297 -0.0403 -0.0307 -0.0434 
MPt - - - - -0.0045 0.0010 
LRt - - - - -0.0025 0.0017 
CPt - - - - 0.0413 -0.0314* 
ERt - - - - 0.7354 0.5363 
Constant 2.8648*** 1.9380* 0.1541*** 0.1005*** 0.1780** 0.0804*** 
τt-1 0.3650 0.8609*** 0.7368** 0.8178*** 0.7492* 0.8853*** 
ut-1 0.7086 0.4729*** -0.2480 -0.2627 -0.3074 -0.3568* 
ut-2 0.4197 -0.5271*** - - - - 
Observation 131 126 131 126 122 122 
Akaike 
(AIC) 447 323 -210 -320 -180 -320 
Schwarz 
(SIC) 539 405 -120 -240 -92 -220 
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Fig. 1. Development of float share value in billion Yuan relative to total share value 
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    Source: China Securities and Futures Market Statistical Data, 2002 
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Fig. 2. Development of turnover ratios and turnover-volatility ratios 
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Fig. 3. The dynamic responses of turnover ratios caused by market reforms 
This figure illustrates significant policy changes and the dynamic response in market liquidity 
triggered by these regulatory changes. Coefficients that are significant on the 95% level of 
confidence represent the immediate response of market liquidity. Due to the autoregressive 
nature of turnover ratios, reactions die out quickly. 
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